Performance Update for Colm Fagan's ARF

And here is a spreadsheet showing monthly cash flows and monthly returns from January 2014 to December 2025 (can't easily access monthly returns prior to Jan 2014).
It shows a lot more besides, which may help to address your question on the riskiness of the portfolio.
Firstly, the maximum monthly return was +13.8% while the minimum was -15.7%. The maximum two-monthly return was +18.8% and the minimum -25.5% (yes, it was scary losing over a quarter of my fund in two months!!!).
However, I focus less on actual returns as shown on the spreadsheet and more on smoothed returns (also shown on the spreadsheet but also shown on the appended chart.
As you can see, the smoothed and actual fund values cross paths regularly; however the actual has now been well ahead of the smoothed for quite a few months, which may be a portend of a turnaround, but I'm always careful not to try to anticipate a downturn. Let's put it this way: my plans/ projections for how much I can withdraw, etc. are always based on smoothed values rather than market values.
It would take a while to explain all the nuances of the smoothed values, but much of it should be intuitive.
Come back to me if you have any questions.
 

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Yes, but surely you're having to keep tabs on everything in order to know if/when you might need to effect changes? And that must take time and effort?
As a friend with similar interests says: "Some people play golf; I can't play golf, so I must do something else to pass the time". I enjoy updating my little spreadsheet weekly (it's not a big overhead with such a small number of stocks). Generally, I just leave it at that.
A few times a year, I may decide to do something more. Sometimes it's simply cashing a small number of shares to meet short-term income needs (generally in my largest holding) but ever since the Novo Nordisk debacle, which I've discussed on this forum many times), I've resolved to sell a share if it comes to represent too high a proportion of my portfolio (probably around 15% for a "growth" share, much more than that for one of my "value" shares, but I don't have a hard and fast rule) or if something causes me to change my mind on a share. For example, I had a complete change of mind about Apple towards end 2024. I'm not sure now what caused it. That's often the case!! I've done nothing so far in 2026 and there's nothing particularly on my mind; however, I may have to sell a small amount sometime in the next month or two - little more than 1.5% to 2% of the total fund value will need to be sold in the entire year, on top of dividend income, to meet "pension" needs.
 
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I hope my other replies have made it clear that I take a more nuanced approach to investments than simply classifying them as "equities", "bonds", etc. I view my shares in Phoenix Group Holdings (say) completely differently than those in Nvidia. Yes, they're both called "equities" but they're as different as chalk and cheese. Phoenix I see as a form of high-yield bond (less so now, as mentioned above) while Nvidia is more like what is normally viewed as an "equity".

Cantor Fitzgerald Multi-Asset 70 Fund - The fund will have an anticipated exposure of 60-80% in return seeking investments such as (equities, property & alternatives)

Performance Fund - Indicative equity range: 65% - 90% of the value of the fund.

When are equities not equities is a probably a debate for another day and who knows what's in the mind of any investment manager when they are buying a specific share and how it fits in to their overall equity strategy.

Surprises me that you don't have the State (DB) pension.

As I've stated before on this forum, you cannot rely on the output from any comparator fund performance tool for 100% accuracy. None of them tell you the exact dates that were used in the figures and none of them tell you what % AMC (if any) is included in the output. It's like the ETF crowd comparing the 'performance' of the index trackers (where no costs at all are included) with other platforms that include OOCs, PTCs and (sometimes) AMCs. Accuracy counts.


Gerard

www.execution-only.ie
 
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Cantor Fitzgerald Multi-Asset 70 Fund - The fund will have an anticipated exposure of 60-80% in return seeking investments such as (equities, property & alternatives)
Current make up according to my online tool: equities 70.7%, property 1%, bonds 15.5%, cash 3.3%, other 9.5%. Very interested in Colms experience, as the multi assset funds seemed to be basically a slightly ‘life-styled’ equity proxy, a bit less upside, a bit less downside. My pension is basically half in the Cantor multi asset 70 and half in the only passive index available to me. Performance is roughly the same, although depending on the period you chose it can be a bit different. Last 24 months, cantor m70 - +42%, passive tracker - + 37%

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Going to assume alternatives here (including Gold) and that's up circa 100% over that period and circa 50% better than cumulative passive equity over last 10.
I guess so, I don’t get anything more than ‘other’. Interestingly you do know when they have made a reasonably big change to the makeup as the pension projections can change a lot and go haywire for a bit until it settles down.
 
I eschewed the bonds part of the "balance" on the grounds that it would mean sacrificing too much long-term return, opting instead for high-yielding "safe" equities (my definition of "safe", of course!!) as my substitute "bonds"; however, I'm happy to hear dissenting views.
I want a combination of "safe" bond-like investments and more risky "equity-like" investments; however, my "safe" investments (such as Phoenix) are called "high-yield equities" (less so now in Phoenix's case after its recent price rise).
Take for example my experience with Phoenix Group quoted above (#236 - the graphs that accompanied that post are included below). The knowledge that I'm assured of a nice steady dividend income means that I don't give a hoot about share price movements.
I have to say that I don’t get this part at all.

Whenever Phoenix pays out a dividend of, say, €2/share, their share price mechanically falls by €2 (if it didn’t, someone would swoop in and arbitrage the hell of this market deficiency).

So getting e.g. a €1,000 dividend payment from Phoenix is strictly equivalent to selling €1,000 worth of Phoenix shares. In both cases, you’re left with €1,000 of cash and your holding of Phonenix shares is now worth €1,000 less.

The only difference between those two scenario could be the tax treatment of the income. But unless I’m missing something, in the case of an ARF, both types of income (dividends or selling shares) will be taxed in exactly the same way (as regular income). There no tax-free allowance or reduced tax rate that applies to dividend income that could make dividend income more beneficial here.

So in the case of an investment in an ARF, whether or not a company pays a dividend or re-invests profits is completely irrelevant.

If Phoenix decided to change its corporate strategy tomorrow and to no longer pay dividends, there should be no reason for you to change your investment strategy. Instead of getting €X/month of dividends from Phoenix, you’d just sell €X worth of Phoenix shares. Your income would remain strictly identical. The overall performance of your fund would remain strictly identical. The taxes you pay would remain strictly identical. This would literally make no difference whatsoever to you.

Now, I could be missing something obvious here so happy to understand this.

But unless I’m missing something, it means that the share price of Phoenix matters just as much as the share price of every other company in your portfolio. In fact, since Phoenix is your largest holding, its share price matters a lot more. Whenever Phoenix pays out a dividend when its share price is at the bottom, you’re in effect selling at the bottom (but with dividends, you can’t even control that. So even if you don’t need the cash at that particular point in time, you’re forced to take it and take the hit).

Looking at the share price graph you shared, it looks like Phoenix is the opposite of a safe, stable, bond-like investment. It’s all over the place.

You got lucky so far - I suspect that you’ve over-performed the market as a whole on average. So that’s amazing and I hope it continues. But I’m not sure the rationalisation o the investment choices makes sense.
 
Now, I could be missing something obvious here so happy to understand this.
Your math is correct but you are missing the economic dimension. Dividend yield says something about the nature of the business. Here are the dividend yields of the top shares in the S&P 500.
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Dividend yields are negligible or even non existent. These are called "growth" stocks as the market is clearly betting on capital growth; any cash that the company is producing is gobbled up in further investment. The dividend is decided by the company. The yield is decided by the share price which in turn is decided by the market. Berkshire H is a bit of an outlier. It could as you say pay dividends if it wanted to without detriment to its business model. Instead it retains them and reinvests, so someone wanting income would have to sell shares rather than receive dividends.
These are the top companies in the FTSE ordered by dividend yield.
1768241057563.webp

It is the nature of these industries to be "cash cows". They spew out cash and have no real outlet for investing it so they return it to shareholders. But again we must note that the yield is a function of the price as decided by the market and not the company. High yields would indicate that the market does not anticipate strong capital growth. The UK long gilt yield is 4.11% so the dividend yield of itself probably includes the equity risk premium on the top ones anyway.
@Colm Fagan 's background is insurance/pensions so he is in a position to assess that this "risk premium" is overstated.
 
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I have to say that I don’t get this part at all.
Hi @PandPs The Duke has said it all for me. Thanks, @Duke of Marmalade.
As I wrote in an earlier post, once upon a time (over two decades ago) I was "With Profits Actuary" for a UK life insurer that was closed to new business. I saw what a cash cow it was for shareholders long after it had stopped taking on new policyholders. (Not sure how good it was for policyholders though!!) That's one of Phoenix's core businesses (probably THE core one). The cash can flow almost straight through to shareholders as dividends.
Eventually, the well will run dry, but it will be many years hence.
PS: I should expand on the above. Maybe it's a bit unfair to say that policyholders are the patsies. The fact that such businesses are cash cows is partly the regulator's fault. The regulator forces companies to hold back lots of capital in case everything goes pear-shaped (new longevity XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX mean that people will live forever, causing annuity costs to increase, AAA bonds default, etc.). Year by year, as it transpires that the world hasn't collapsed, the cash that's been held back for such contingencies can be released - on a very gradual basis.
PPS: don't know what happened there! I think the system thought I was saying something nasty when I was referring to aspirin, etc!!!!
 
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I saw what a cash cow it was for shareholders long after it had stopped taking on new policyholders. (Not sure how good it was for policyholders though!!) That's one of Phoenix's core businesses (probably THE core one). The cash can flow almost straight through to shareholders as dividends.

What you appear to be describing is a company that buys WP books of business, from formerly good companies that are now dying, and are drying the marrow from the policyholders bones to the advantage of shareholders. I presume, if you were a policyholder of one of the companies under it's umbrella, you'd be reluctant to stay one as it would appear that there's only going to be one winner here as the cash is flowing to the shareholders and not the policyholders.
 
formerly good companies that are now dying, and are drying the marrow from the policyholders bones to the advantage of shareholders. I
Hi. That's why I added the PS to my post above, which you may have missed:
Maybe it's a bit unfair to say that policyholders are the patsies. The fact that such businesses are cash cows is partly the regulator's fault. The regulator forces companies to hold back lots of capital in case everything goes pear-shaped (new longevity XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX mean that people will live forever, causing annuity costs to increase, AAA bonds default, etc.). Year by year, as it transpires that the world hasn't collapsed, the cash that's been held back for such contingencies can be released - on a very gradual basis.
PPS: don't know what happened there! I think the system thought I was saying something nasty when I was referring to aspirin, etc!!!!
You've may have heard of the term "new business strain" in the life assurance business. That's the extra capital that regulators force insurers to set aside when writing new business, for various reasons, including the risk of things going wrong. That additional capital need arises even if the business is expected to be very profitable. The opposite happens when businesses are in rundown.


Now to move to what I intended to write when I sat down this morning.
@PandPs put a lot of effort into their post. Thanks. They deserve a more comprehensive reply. I may not be able to cover everything now (domestic pressures!) but I'll make a start anyway.
Whenever Phoenix pays out a dividend of, say, €2/share, their share price mechanically falls by €2 (if it didn’t, someone would swoop in and arbitrage the hell of this market deficiency).
You're right. Every half-year, the share price falls (more or less by the amount of the dividend) on the day it goes ex-dividend (xd) reflecting the fact that value is transferred from the share price to shareholders' pockets. Those half-yearly price falls are fully reflected in the quoted prices and in the graphs attached to my previous post.
You're also right about the dividend being received gross.
If Phoenix decided to change its corporate strategy tomorrow and to no longer pay dividends, there should be no reason for you to change your investment strategy. Instead of getting €X/month of dividends from Phoenix, you’d just sell €X worth of Phoenix shares. Your income would remain strictly identical. The overall performance of your fund would remain strictly identical. The taxes you pay would remain strictly identical. This would literally make no difference whatsoever to you.
In theory, you're right here too. I'd say that there are quite a few members of the Phoenix Board and management team who'd like not to have the millstone of a high dividend around their necks, but they're stuck with it. They know that a change in strategy could potentially cause the share price to plummet. Shareholders are comfortable with the strategy that's there now. The devil you know is better than the devil you don’t know, etc.
If they make a big acquisition (e.g., taking on Standard Life a few years ago - which caused me to lose a job by the way, but that's another story!), their only realistic option was a rights issue, accompanied by a promise to keep the dividend at its former level.
Whenever Phoenix pays out a dividend when its share price is at the bottom, you’re in effect selling at the bottom (but with dividends, you can’t even control that. So even if you don’t need the cash at that particular point in time, you’re forced to take it and take the hit).
I'm not sure I get this part of your post. Dividends are within the company's control; the share price is not. It's determined by others. The Board is committed to paying a dividend of x every half-year. If something terrible happens to the business, i.e., in the real world, then they can reduce it, but they take all sorts of steps (hedging, etc.) to minimise the risk of having to cut the dividend. The price is a different story. They have no control over that so they're not going to cut the dividend just because the share price has fallen.
Looking at the share price graph you shared, it looks like Phoenix is the opposite of a safe, stable, bond-like investment. It’s all over the place.
Yes, that's one of the points I was trying to make. That's why I'm not too concerned about the price. I (or my estate) will have to worry about it sometime, of course.
As to what causes the share price to gyrate so wildly, I may have to come back on that, but I'll mention a few factors.
Firstly, everyone agrees on what the next dividend is going to be, probably the next few dividends.
Even if dividends were cast-iron guaranteed though, the share price would still gyrate as the discount rate investors used to value future dividends changed. Consider it as a very long-dated bond.
But dividends are going to rise or fall in the long-term. History shows them rising gradually. Even I don't expect them to keep rising, but others may be that optimistic. There's also a possibility that they'll fall. That's the natural course of events if Phoenix doesn't acquire new business. Therefore, some of the price changes reflect changing views on how dividends will progress in future (and whether they'll overpay for new business).
A final consideration is the price at which the share will eventually be sold. If it's a bond, you're guaranteed the nominal value at maturity. There's no such guarantee with Phoenix. I (or my estate) will be completely at the mercy of the market when the share is eventually sold. The price then could be 741, as it is currently, or it could be down to 480, what it was this time last year. That's a much greater imponderable than the dividend. It doesn't worry me too much, provided the dividend is secure, which it was this time last year as well. It does worry others. For example, based on what he's written on this forum many times about his loss aversion, I doubt if @Duke of Marmalade would invest in it. He'd prefer to keep his money in the bank.
 
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Hi @PandPs . Are you satisfied with my responses to your comments/ questions? Are there any aspects I haven't covered that you'd like addressed? I put a lot of time and effort into the reply. It would be nice to know if it was time well spent.
Similarly for @GSheehy. Have your concerns been addressed?
 
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Thanks Colm and all for taking the time to discuss this in such detail, it is v useful. I think a focus on higher dividend shares (instead of bonds) makes a lot of sense, despite the potential share price volatility. I personally would love a mechanism that pooled/ smoothed market returns for investors, reducing sequence of return risks in exchange for losing some potential upside (which I think you proposed Colm, I didn’t fully understand).
 
Hi @Sybilla
Thanks for your kind words.
High dividend shares have their downsides. They’re generally seen as plodders. The sharp rise in the Phoenix share price over the past 12 months is unusual and could be seen as eating the seed corn. On the other hand, low/ no dividend shares can experience phenomenal growth. I have shares in Nvidia which pays hardly any dividend (1 cent a quarter on a share priced around $180) but its earnings have grown like topsy. There’s nowt for nowt, of course: you have to pay a very high multiple of earnings for Nvidia.
Yes, I have proposed smoothed returns but it only works for auto-enrolment. It doesn’t mean any loss of return whatsoever. Long-term returns are the same as from a pure (unsmoothed) equity portfolio, with all the bumps and hollows removed.
I’ll post a link to where I’ve explained it. Not now, though: I’m away from base, waiting in a hospital for my wife to be seen after breaking her kneecap!!
PS: there is stuff on my website colmfagan.ie.
 
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As requested by @Sybilla
I personally would love a mechanism that pooled/ smoothed market returns for investors, reducing sequence of return risks in exchange for losing some potential upside (which I think you proposed Colm, I didn’t fully understand)
Hi @Sybilla, your wish is my command! See the references below to smoothed values/ returns.

Continuing to review my drawdown pension (ARF) at 31 December 2025, the average return (time-weighted) in the 12 years from 1/1/2014 was 9.9% a year, but with big variations around that average.

To prevent myself from getting too excited by good short-term returns or too depressed by bad ones, I devised a type of smoothed values, which I use for planning. The smoothing formula and associated monthly values (smoothed and market) are on the pensions tab of my website colmfagan.ie (entry of14 Jan 2026). Both are graphed below. (I've also attached the spreadsheet below, to save people from having to visit my website, which is not very well organised).

Market value exceeded smoothed value for the latest 26 months in a row, the longest such run since the start. At 31 Dec 2025, smoothed value was just 89.5% of market value, which some may interpret as a sign that markets are frothy. I’m agnostic, other than noting that, if the market value falls 10% overnight this month, my plans will be relatively unaffected.

The contrast between market values (jagged blue line) and smoothed values (orange line) is stark. Monthly market returns ranged from minus 15.7% (March 2020) to plus 13.8% (July 2022). Monthly smoothed returns (the slope of the orange line, adjusting for cash flows) ranged from an ANNUALISED plus 4.8% (March 2020) to an ANNUALISED plus 12.5% (May 2015). Smoothed returns were never negative, not even during COVID. Smoothed and market values crossed 17 times in the 12 years.

For my personal fund, smoothed values are just a psychological comfort blanket: if I had to sell the entire fund in March 2020, I would have suffered the full brunt of that month’s 15.7% fall; however, whilst smoothing is just a psychological crutch for my personal fund, it can be made very real for members of an Auto-Enrolled pension scheme, where there are strict rules to prevent sophisticated operators from playing the system. Members must always buy and sell at smoothed values.

Sadly, the Irish government missed the opportunity. It rejected my smoothed proposal, which would mean investing entirely in equities pre and post-retirement, with returns smoothed to eliminate short-term volatility. Instead, the national AE scheme, My Future Fund, operates on the outdated concept of “lifestyle” investing. By default, members’ funds will be transferred to lower risk assets at age 51 and even lower-risk assets at 61, irrespective of prevailing market conditions, thereby condemning members to lower returns just when their funds are at their highest. To illustrate the implications, the expected return in one year close to retirement exceeds the expected total return in the first ten years - IF expected rates of return are the same. But they’re not. Lifestyling means that the expected rate of return close to retirement is only a fraction of expected return in the early years, when good returns have little impact on fund value. Furthermore, under the government scheme, members will be forced to leave at retirement and take their chances with high-margin (and typically low-return) post-retirement products.
 

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Purely by accident, I came across a post from seven years ago, which seems to indicate that the Equity Risk Premium has fallen dramatically over the intervening period, which could be taken as a danger sign.
Here's what I wrote on 14 January 2019:
(https://www.askaboutmoney.com/threa...-private-investor.195710/page-25#post-1608027):
"If I were to buy a government bond (most unlikely in my case), I would be discounting future receipts at the bond yield, which is currently 0.84% per annum for an Irish 10-year bond, i.e. I set up a little spreadsheet, insert future coupons each half-year and the redemption amount at the end of ten years into the spreadsheet, discount them all at 0.84% per annum and I arrive at the current market price of the bond.

"It's more difficult to do the same calculation for a share, because of the uncertainties surrounding future income, but I try. Take Phoenix Group, which I mentioned at the end of my latest diary entry as offering very good value (IMO). How did I come to that conclusion?

"The current annualised dividend is 45.2p a share. I'll assume that the dividend is safe, that it won't increase or reduce in future, and that I'll be able to get my money back in ten years' time. These are all heroic assumptions, but I think they're as reasonable as any other assumptions: the actual result could be better or worse with approximately equal probability (in my opinion). Because of the uncertainties, however, I'll discount expected future receipts, not at 0.84% a year (which is what I'd use for a government bond), but at 7.5% per annum. The share price that will give me that return is 603p, which is almost precisely the current price."
"Therefore, on my reckoning, at the current price, I'm expecting to get an equity risk premium of 6.66% a year (7.5% - 0.84%) for my investment in Phoenix Group. There are uncertainties around that estimate, of course, but that's precisely why I'm getting a risk premium.

"PS: I'm not recommending Phoenix Group as an investment; I'm simply using it as an example to show how I do my own personal equity risk premium calculations. I hope I've also answered the Duke's question as to why I expect to get 6% a year in future. There's a good safety margin in the 6% estimate!"

The corresponding figures now are:
Annualised dividend 54.7p, price 736, so dividend yield is 7.4%. Government bond yield now 3.2%, so ERP = 4.2% v 6.7% on 14 January 2019. That's a fall of 2.5%. Not a good sign!

If I'd done my sums right, the figures would be worse. I compared a sterling dividend yield with a Euro bond yield. Also, the dividend for H2 2018 was 23.4p, so the annualised dividend was 46.8p.
Putting all those figures together, we get:
14 January 2019: Dividend Yield: 46.8/609 = 7.7%. Gilt yield: 1.3%. ERP: 6.4%
20 January 2026: Dividend Yield: 54.7/736 = 7.4% Gilt yield: 4.5% ERP: 2.9%. ERP fell by 3.5%!!!!!

I hasten to add that I don't have anyone to check my figures, so I could be wrong - but I doubt if I've made a complete mess of the sums.
If my figures are anyway close, the implications are clear: the market is currently in nosebleed territory. This assumes, of course, that Phoenix Group is priced efficiently relative to the market, that its prospects now haven't changed dramatically, etc., etc.
I would welcome any thoughts on whether I've erred in my analysis above.
 
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14 January 2019: Dividend Yield: 46.8/609 = 7.7%. Gilt yield: 1.3%. ERP: 6.4%
20 January 2026: Dividend Yield: 54.7/736 = 7.4% Gilt yield: 4.5% ERP: 2.9%. ERP fell by 3.5%!!!!!
Way out of my depth here but while those numbers show a reduction in ERP, is this more a reflection on the Gilt yield (and confidence in the national coffers) than a particular issue with the Dividend/Equity? I understand the thinking but not the conclusion of a bad sign and the market being in nosebleed territory (based on this particular stock).
 
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