This isn’t a uniquely Irish thing. The regulatory paralysis of projects, especially but not solely infrastructure/development projects, is a live issue in a lot of countries. In the UK recently there was much discussion about how long the High Speed Rail link has taken, how little progress has been made, how much projected costs have ballooned, and how so much of this is attributable to regulatory overkill, regulatory replication and siloed regulatory agencies not talking to one another. And there are similar discussions going on in Australia, both at the federal level and in several states. And I’ve seen similar comments from the US. Etc, etc.
It’s a complex phenomenon which I suspect doesn’t have a simple cause or a simple solution. But remember how we got here; Collison makes the point that in the Good Old Days, when Ministers could drive projects through, there was scope for poor decision-making (the Minister’s enthusiasm for a project does not necessarily correlate well with public benefit), wasteful spending and outright corruption. I think that’s why we have seen regulatory authority taken away from Ministers and transferred to officials who act at arm’s length. We don’t trust the Ministers; we fear they will act stupidly, venally or corruptly.
If anything, the last generation has seen further erosion of trust in politicians and in the political establishment; we trust them even less than we did when we set up independent regulatory authorities. So abolishing the agencies, or simply giving Ministers the power to override their decisions, is not a no-brainer. You don’t necessarily improve matters by switching from a system in which development can be vetoed by an environmental protection agency that considers nothing but environmental matters and doesn’t take a holistic view, to a system in which development can be progressed by a Minister who doesn’t think about environmental matters at all and doesn’t take holistic view. (Or, for the environment, substitute any other public policy consideration that you like.)
It’s also worth pointing out that abolishing the agencies, in itself, doesn’t result in a huge reduction in costs. Sticking with the environment as an example of a public policy consideration, if you say, e.g., from now on the Minister will grant approvals required under the environmental protection legislation, then environmental impact assessments will still be required, and the Minister will need staff to review those assessments and advise him on them. So the most of the staff of the agency simply transfer to the Department and, instead of advising the agency CEO, they advise the Minister, who makes the decisions that the agency CEO used to make. If you want to reduce the burden of environmental regulation, then I think your choices are:
- Put more resources into the regulatory agency, so that submissions are considered more quickly and decisions are made sooner.
- Reduce the regulatory requirement so that, e.g., a wider range of projects doesn’t require regulatory approval at all.
The latter would be controversial, to put it no higher.
I’m aware of a proposal in Australia to try to tackle these issues, not by transferring power back to Ministers, but by appointing a “Co-ordinator General”, who would be a public servant. Ministers will identify particular projects as being of strategic significance, and once they do so the Co-ordinator General will liaise with the project promoters (who may be in the public sector or the private sector) and the regulatory agencies involved to co-ordinate their activities and drive the process forward. He’ll have powers to compel agencies to devote additional resources to assessing and making decisions about the project; to get agencies talking to one another; to set time-scales for decision-making, and to dispense with regulatory processes that he thinks duplicate one another. This is essentially the kind of thing that Collison reckons Ministers used to be able to do, back in the day.
Will it work? I dunno. But it might be worth a try.