Eddie Hobbs new Brendan Investments vehicle

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It is assumed that rational people are capable of informing themselves. More so “investors” are assumed to understand or know of the nature of risk and reward.

People are free to make up their own mind and do so using their own judgement. The quality of their own judgement is based in part on their own experiential learning, knowledge and competence. Investors either self-advise or seek advice. Again it is their choice. Of course the quality of this advice is a matter for them.

The assumption underlying consumer protection is one of an adult-adult relationship. It is not a parent-child relationship. Is it being suggested that people should be protected from themselves? I should think not.

One of the more interesting aspects of Brendan Investments is the disintermediation of the intermediary. It may well prove a test of investor maturity. Could this be at the heart of some of the concerns being expressed ?
 
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I have a potential conflict of interest so if I pull this post please do not be surprised.

It would be helpful if other posters on the thread would declare , as required by our posting guidelines:
You are welcome to recommend or fairly criticize a product or company. But if you have a connection with the company or any other potential conflict of interest, please state this in your reply.
 
One of the more interesting aspects of Brendan Investments is the disintermediation of the intermediary. It may well prove a test of investor maturity. Could this be at the heart of some of the concerns being expressed ?

That is an unfair accusation.

Eddie's property vehicle has a fee structure that appears to be similar to that of a hedge fund (though I know of no hedge fund with a 10-year lock-up) and I would question how suitable such an investment vehicle is for a retail investor who can only afford to invest €5k. On balance, however, the proposed fees seem to be industry standard so Eddies is simply joining the party - caveat emptor.

I do agree with you that most investors have the ability to protect themselves but generally are too lazy to do so. I have no pity for the retail investor who fails to read the fine print and it is impossible to protect people from their own greed. No matter, after the property madness has died down, the retail investor will once again find a brand new way to loose money.
 
Certain rambling and off topic posts have been removed as they are detracting from the specifics of the product being discussed. It has also been noted that certain poster(s) contributing to this thread have a vested interest in the product/service being discussed.

They have 2 options:

- declare that interest in public; or
- desist from posting further

MugsGame has already drawn attention to this above and if the poster(s) in question do not take notice, they will be banned.
 
Declaration of Interest:

(1) No association with Brendan Investments
(2) Will not be investing
(3) Know Eddie Hobbs quite well
(4) Independent thinker
(5) Know what I don't know
(5) Have my own opinion
 
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Brendan, you are right, the combination of the EH factor, the 5K minimum entry and the lack of remuneration for financial advice means this is destined to be a mass market execution only retail product. In fact, I see little appetite for this amongst the usual inner circle. This looks like 5,000 small punters paying an average 10K into a very complex and unregulated product and without quality advice.

AAM should try to address that deficiency.

A punter should be making the assessment on the following fronts (one assumes they get the general gist of such things as the length of the investment period etc.):

1) Full understanding of the risks.

2) Confidence that the team are up to the task (I think it is on this score that it will be shunned by the "professionals").

3) Awareness of the true level of costs and charges.

At this point I will address only the (1).

The risks derive mainly from the high gearing.

Note there is nothing wrong with non recourse internal gearing per se. Most equity shares are the same, get the banks to provide as much "cheap" debt as possible and maximise the risk/reward to the shareholder.

But is the gearing risk properly explained? I don't think so.

The Brochure puts it like this: if the underlying investments perform +20% gearing means you enjoy 80% return. True, and to be fair they do highlight this, if the underlying performance is -20% you lose 80%. I'd say most punters would see that as a no-brainer, the chances of +20% over 10 years are surely much greater than the chances of -20%.

But this is a gross misrepresentation, possibly inadvertent in the interests of simplicity.

When you borrow to invest the first hurdle is to service the debt. In addition in this case you need to fund the geared management charge. I'd say that between debt servicing and management charge we have about 7% per annum burden before the gearing is even breaking even. 7% p.a. that's about +100% over 10 years. Here's how the gearing risk should have been explained:

If the underling investments double over 10 years, the effect of the gearing will be neutral. If the underlying performance is +125% your return will be +200%. If the underlying performance is +75% you will get your money back!!
 
Is anyone going to attend the "workshops" with Eddie Hobbs about this product? I only caught a glimpse of the advertisement but I think there's one on in Citywest this Thursday?
In my view the great danger with this product is that people will see it as a kind of Quinlan Private for the masses. The problem is the risk profile of the two groups of investors will be so different.
 
Regarding these terms and conditions and the general modalities of the scheme my comments are as follows

The 1% management charge on the fund value is within industry norms; especially as stated by earlier participants, property management has to be very hands on and is a credible amount to charge. What does disturb me however is the low bench mark of internal rate of return of 8% or IRR. This fund only needs to return an overall growth rate of 2% from the total fund before the principles reward themselves - taking one fifth of every percentage point over this target. The IRR is the annualised effective compounded return rate, which can be earned on the invested capital hence 8% is based on the initial money invested. Inflation rises in property prices and rent reviews should mean, even without any insightful input this target should be easily attained.

However, my initial reaction on the people directly involved is they have a skill set for making money, not necesscary through canny property opportunities but through terms and conditions which are swayed to their advantage.

I think their brochure is very non specific and not very strong on property investment strategies. Anyone believing there is still some value in either the Irish or UK commercial sectors needs their heads examined. Rental yields in both markets have been seriously compressed in recent years because of huge property value increases. London now has the highest cost per square metre compared to any other worldwide capital city. Rental return from properties either in UK or Ireland bought in 2007 is at best 4%, whilst the cost of borrowing is 4.75%+. Banks are now becoming more stringent on money lending since the sub prime debacle and this should mean capital repayments will be expected also during the 10 year investment cycle. To achieve this and for the investment to wash its face, yields would will have to be in excess of 7% - which are impossible to realise in either of these markets. As far as other area’s within the UK, London commercial in the medium term is forecast to slacken due to contraction in the services and banking sector and any deterioration in London will have a knock effect across whole of the UK. London is the only tax paying area of the UK making profit for its government and effectively every other region barring the Home Counties surrounding London are subsidised - North East England, Scotland and Northern Ireland being the highest drainers on its exchequer in ascending order.

On Germany, they are correct about opportunities within the market especially retail. In this sector, Germans for the first time in years are beginning to open their wallets and spend money. To date retail planning is a highly restricted practise compared to other EU countries and therefore the amount of retail square footage per capita of population is much lower than most other EU countries. The yields of 6% to 7.5% are presently being achieved across the board and these look set to enjoy decent rent reviews with increasing yields of 8.5% to 10.5% by 2009 - these for years have been stagnant due to depressed spending activities. Office space especially in the south western regions can also return up to 10% presently so it is also a good area to investment. Finally Germany is introducing real estate investment trusts (REIT’s) from hopefully about 2009, which will stimulate the market and create new avenues of cash flow and liquidity.

I do not know much about Portugal but I would have thought similar to Spain it has a lot of sub prime borrowing, and to much residential development in the last decade, especially within the holiday homes sector. Any affect on the residential market could have implications for its commercial sector and general economy.

Although the 8% IRR should be a given on an investment vehicle with a 75% debt ratio, this could be in doubt if they consider some of the above locations - a burning of investors money could ensue as you are only as strong as your weakest link with debt gearing - however this will not be a negative equity product after its ten years but I do not think it will not set the stars alight either.

Regarding the future of property - the stimulus behind property growth in what I would describe as “mature property markets” such as Ireland, UK and Portugal (Spain, certain area’s of the States, Dubai etc are the same) has been kept bumping along fantastically as a result of nothing other than the world economy been driven by a huge credit market - which is sadly beginning to fall apart.

The global economy (particularly America) has not seen a serious protracted recession for at least 20 years. America has staved off recession after the dot.com bubble by ridiculously cutting interest rates which caused a false sense of security but made the banks go into overdrive to learn new ways of driving the economy and making profits. Now a few years on, the good old days seem to be over as the yen carry trade (the main credit culprit) of 0.5% borrowing by world banks and investing elsewhere e.g. Australia at 7.5% interest accounts etc is over, as the yen is starting to appreciate against the dollar and the credit derivatives markets with collateralised debt obligations (CDO's), paper margins etc are now all in mass panic and this will spread to affect any market based on credit – hence property.

Agflation from wheat, corn, pork, beef plus other commodities are rising steeply and looks to me, like a re-run of the 1970's. If there is going to be a credit crunch globally with inflation rising outside the control of governments then - should recession ensue, would holiday homes in the Algarve, (which I am sure are not the cheapest) be the best investment vehicle out there to protect your income in the medium term?

I’m all for property investment because of its leverage but only within under valued regions with some strong fundamentals. If I had my say in a fund – I’d be buying farmland in either Argentina or Iowa, due to agflation, which is here for a while (corn still 75% lower than 1975). Both have seen huge rises in value of 40% to 19% respectively (2006) and since early 2006 many American & Europe Hedge funds having been buying land worldwide in blocks of 30,000 acres and spending in the billions. For any investment to work their must be good financial discipline and the fundamentals must be right – without either is sheer madness. Excess credit and inflation are like loose woman and rum – both are sure to lead to ruin. I hope the principals of Brendan Investments take this into account?
 
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Another important factor to be taken into account when considering this investment is that although the brochure and prospectus describe in general terms the markets it is intended to invest in, there are no specific investments or projects identified.

This means that once the investors' cash is raised it will take some time to identify suitable investments. In the interim, presumably the cash will be on deposit somewhere and definitely won't be growing at Brendan Investments' targetted 16% p.a. after management charges.

It is not unknown for syndicated property funds to be sitting on investors' cash for up to a year while trying to choose a suitable investment. I'm not saying this will happen with Brendan Investments, but personally I would not invest in a geared property fund which did not have a clearly described specific investment in mind from the outset.

Apart from getting your investment cash to work sooner, it also means you can make a better assessment of the fund's prospects given the more specific detail available.
 
Hobbs yesterday on radio challenged the institutions to come up with a cheaper model involving Development and Investment. He seemed confident nobody can and I would be slow to bet against him. For example the Augusta fund used here pays 1.5m upfront or 7.5% of the 20m to be raisede by the promoter in the form of commission rebates the firm will get from property sales agents. That is a conflict of interest in my book. It also pays 3% to 4% commission. The fund charge is 0.75% on the leveraged fund and it is 100% Investment properties with zero Development.

Proper internal analysis already circulating from fund managers indicates that Hobbs model is well designed. The bonus on performance will pay a lot to the promoters though. This is a competitive industry and based on a lot of the comments here it is clear that Hobbs intervention is hurting.
 
Hobbs yesterday on radio challenged the institutions to come up with a cheaper model involving Development and Investment. He seemed confident nobody can and I would be slow to bet against him. For example the Augusta fund used here pays 1.5m upfront or 7.5% of the 20m to be raisede by the promoter in the form of commission rebates the firm will get from property sales agents. That is a conflict of interest in my book. It also pays 3% to 4% commission. The fund charge is 0.75% on the leveraged fund and it is 100% Investment properties with zero Development.

It was me who initially drew the comparison with Augusta and I did make the point at the time that I wasn't saying they were especially cheap - but Brendan Investments' anuual management charge is one third as big again as Augusta's at 1% p.a. on the leveraged fund and their performance fee is dramatically higher, which to me is the key issue on charges.

Some posters here seem to be implying that the higher performance fees are justifed on the basis that Brendan Investments will be investing about 25% in development projects. The individual investor only cares about returns - not whether they're involved in development or not. I stand over my opinion that the 20% charge on returns over 8% p.a. is exorbitant and I will eat my hat if Brendan Investments can point to any other comparable fund charging such a high performance fee on such a low performance target.
 
Gonk, the open market price for Development is 3% pa, so a 25% allocation implies an apportioned cost of 0.75%. This in turn indicates that the 75% to investment property, by this measure, is 0.25% pa. Your analysis

Now take Hibernian Life's European Residential Property fund launhched in april. this has a MINIMUM annual charge of 1.45% to 1.55% depending on the product on top of which brokers can add a further 1% pa. So the lowest is 1.45% of the leveraged fund and the highest is 2.55% pa. There is no development.
 
Gonk, the open market price for Development is 3% pa, so a 25% allocation implies an apportioned cost of 0.75%. This in turn indicates that the 75% to investment property, by this measure, is 0.25% pa. Your analysis.

Not my analysis - yours.

I am happy to accept that the annual management fee is in line with similar funds, if somewhat on the high side. However, if you read my earlier posts, you will see - as in my last post - the main issue I have with Brendan Investments' charges is the performance fee, which if they meet their target of performance exceeding 16% p.a. will amount to €22.5m plus, or 45% of the subscribed funds of €50m. The performance fee will kick in at a return of 8% p.a., which could only be described as mediocre to poor performance for a 75% geared fund. If the directors only achieve 8% p.a. they would deserve rebuke, not bonuses.

I will be amazed if you or anyone else can show us a comparable fund with such a high rate of performance fee on such a low performance target.
 
At the IIF standard projection the RIY on the Hibernian fund reduces the gross growth from 6% to 3.6% ie over 40% at such a low, low growth. I make this point because, while the performance bonus is 20% above 8% IRR, there is no upfront fee like Augusta's 1.5m or 7.5% of the equity, there is no 3% to 4% to intermediaries and there are no "sales" fees for turning over the properties within the structure. This is why I think that Hobbs challenge will continue to go unopposed. He has clearly done is homework on the competition.
 
At the IIF standard projection the RIY on the Hibernian fund reduces the gross growth from 6% to 3.6% ie over 40% at such a low, low growth. I make this point because, while the performance bonus is 20% above 8% IRR, there is no upfront fee like Augusta's 1.5m or 7.5% of the equity, there is no 3% to 4% to intermediaries and there are no "sales" fees for turning over the properties within the structure. This is why I think that Hobbs challenge will continue to go unopposed. He has clearly done is homework on the competition.

All of the above will be dwarfed by Brendan Investments' performance fee if they meet or exceed their targetted returns. You are not comparing like with like when you refer to the Hiberrnian fund. If Brendan Investments were subject to the Irish Insurance Federation standard projection, they wouldn't be able to make claims like the one in the brochure that they will outperform all the competition and achieve returns in excess of 16% p.a.
 
...the open market price for Development is 3% pa, so a 25% allocation implies an apportioned cost of 0.75%. This in turn indicates that the 75% to investment property, by this measure, is 0.25% pa. Your analysis

This is baloney. The Prospectus clearly states that the investors funds will be used to pay for development costs in addition to the 1% fee paid to the managers.

This whole 25% Development thing is really being exploited to suggest some USP in the product.

For example, we are told that promoters of non-Development schemes estimate returns of 12% to 16% and Brendan should have better potential than them because it has 25% Development. Notice the very clever ruse here. Double digit returns are slipped into the Brochure as other people's estimates. By suggesting that this scheme will most likely do even better than these inferior versions, the investor is immediately left with an impression of at least high teens growth being pretty much on the cards.
 
Did anybody notice on the LLS when asked about the other Directcors by Pat Kenny, EH made reference to a Pat Owens. There is nobody by this name mentioned in the prospectus.
 
This is a competitive industry and based on a lot of the comments here it is clear that Hobbs intervention is hurting.

Or maybe some of the informed posters on Askaboutmoney simply don't think it's as wonderful as Hobbs would have people believe. Someone's clearly having a hard time answering the critics.

Proper internal analysis already circulating from fund managers indicates that Hobbs model is well designed.

Such "hearsay" statements from an anonymous poster add little to this thread in my opinion, unless they can be backed up. I choose to be anonymous also but I will not try to post anything along the lines of "I hear from well-placed sources that Brendan Investments are X, Y or Z." I will stick to facts.

...this has a MINIMUM annual charge of 1.45%...

Actually the minimum on the Hibernian product is 1.4%. So that's 1.4% of invested funds as against Brendan's 4% of invested funds. As was posted already, if an investor puts in €100,000, Brendan gears it up to €400,000 and then takes €4,000 in charges, that's 4% of the amount invested.

Mantus and previous incarnations have made the questionable argument that investing in development somehow justifies extra charges. Even if we accept that argument, development only represents 25% of the fund. So how is such a high charge justified on the remaining 75% of the fund?
 
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