20,000 deliberate defaulters

Discussion in 'Housing and mortgage arrears - policy issues' started by Sarenco, May 14, 2015.

  1. Delboy

    Delboy Frequent Poster

    And all repossession cases are a reflection of....

    See also recent threads on court sittings and levels of no-shows
  2. WizardDr

    WizardDr Frequent Poster

    All I want is a source for the figures.

    There isn't one is there?

    Repossession activity now reflects the fact that the soaring price of properties means the banks may not lose as much as they thought if at all.
  3. dereko1969

    dereko1969 Frequent Poster

    Interesting to see one of the main points from Dan O'Brien's piece in the Indo on Fingers appearance was the legacy of his and others decisions.

    "More unwelcome news came from the huge number of landlords who remain in arrears.
    Known in the jargon as "buy-to-let" mortgages, there are more than 30,000 of these loans in arrears, representing nearly one in four of the total.
    Amazingly, the non-performing share of buy-to-let mortgages has not fallen since the authorities starting counting them three years ago.
    More astounding still is the fact that there has been a huge increase (from 4pc of the total three ago, to 11pc as of June 2015) in the share of buy-to-let mortgages which are in arrears for more than two years."

    I'm sure that some of these buy-to-lets are empty but I'm also sure that there must be a large number of them where the landlord has been continuously collecting rent and not passing it on to the banks. Time to repossess these properties.
  4. DCD

    DCD Frequent Poster

    Brendan is spot on. I know of two separate couples who had a number of investment properties. They got into serious arrears kept collecting the rent. Spent the rent on lifestyle. Eventually the banks have taken back the properties after years of spending and paying no loans.
  5. Sarenco

    Sarenco Frequent Poster

    Hi DCB

    I think I made it clear in my earlier posts that I wasn't for a second denying that there are borrowers that make a conscious, rational decision to stop making mortgage repayments by choice.

    My argument is that there is absolutely no way of verifying the 20,000 figure. it's pure guess work and serves as a distraction in any discussions on the slow pace of repossessions.
  6. Delboy

    Delboy Frequent Poster

    Can't find the report on the Indo site yet so how many 'thousands' are there actually assumed in the report, I don't know. But it only confirms what most rational people thought when it came to strategic default in Ireland

    Thousands of people stopped paying their mortgages once they knew their houses wouldn't be repossessed.

  7. MrEarl

    MrEarl Frequent Poster

    I wonder how many are still not making their regular repayments ?

    I would imagine quite a few, given the level of long term arrears that the Banks still refer to, the various loan portfolio sales taking place (or due to take place) etc.
  8. Delboy

    Delboy Frequent Poster

    David Hall was on the radio earlier dismissing the CB report and telling them to do some worthwhile work!
    He talked about the margin of error on opinion polls and if applied to an academic reports like this, there'd be nothing to talk about so move on.

    He's coming up on the Ciara Kelly midday show on Newstalk soon
  9. Protocol

    Protocol Frequent Poster


    An Economic Letter by Terry O’Malley, published today, considers whether reducing the risk of repossession resulted in more Irish borrowers defaulting on their mortgages. An Economic Letter, entitled Did the Dunne Judgement Lead to More Mortgage Defaults? specifically considers the impact of a high court ruling in 2011, known as the “Dunne judgment”, which temporarily removed a bank’s ability to lawfully repossess a home.

    The key findings are:

    • Borrowers defaulted on mortgages after the judgement at a higher rate than if the repossession regime at the time had been legally upheld.
    • Borrowers who defaulted were more likely to be in negative equity, more likely to have missed payments before the judgement, more likely to have slightly lower incomes on average and were more likely to face higher interest rates and be on a variable rate mortgage.
    • The default rate is found to have been one half a percentage point (0.5%) higher on average in each quarter after the judgement than would have been otherwise expected, given the difference in the default rates before the judgement.