ultimately then NAMA was a failure , Im talking about the actual decision to set up a bad bank in the first place because it crystalised all the "bad loans" immediately and that 32 billion was added to our national debt which precipitated the need for the government bailout anyway. If the government had known that they probably would have went with the other options like an insurance scheme whereby they would cover the bad loans of the banks if they went bad. Of course nobody knows how that would have gone , maybe the bond markets would not have bought that either. But politically the bad bank option did not save the then government. I remember that the department of finance were like headless chickens with no expertise on how to handle such a crises as Brian Lenihan recounted laterNot sure what came first the chicken (NAMA) or the egg (greenlight for ECB MRO access for NAMA bonds).........my guess is the egg came first.....as soon as the ECB indicated to tthe state that an off-balance sheet SPV with securities guaranteed by the state could be used as collateral by the banks to access ECB MRO using them.....the choice was clear.....you set up NAMA to get the €32bn capital injection at ultra low rates (1%).....the hubris I guess was thinking that the bond vigilantes would somehow think of these NAMA bonds as anything different than sovereign liabilities and that they wouldn't add it to our national debt.