Financial Ombudsman fails to challenge Danske Bank's Mortgage interest increase.

A

Asphyxia

Guest
On examination of the original investigation by the F.S.O. with regard to the Millar's complaint, in particular, the response by Danske Bank to question 21(4) posed by the F.S.O. ( see below)


21. As part of that investigation, the Ombudsman on the 26th September, 2013, served on the bank a summary of the Millars’ complaint and a schedule of questions and evidence required from the bank. The bank responded on the 24th October, 2013. These are the questions posed and the answers given:


    • 1. Please clarify whether or not the bank is willing to list any of the criteria taken into account by the bank when calculating the increase in the variable rate of interest.
      A. No, the bank is not prepared to divulge commercially sensitive information to the Complainants. However, we confirm that funding costs are most certainly taken into consideration. Indeed, these would be a primary driver of the decision.


      2. Please clarify whether or not the criteria relied on by the bank when making its decision to increase the variable standard rate were audited by any external independent entity in order to verify that the increase was set in accordance with accepted banking procedures and if it was commercially justifiable.

      A. We have not had an audit carried out by an external independent entity. The bank is not subject to regulated pricing on mortgage interest rates, as these decisions do not fall under the scope of s. 149 of the Consumer Credit Act 1995.

      However, we have a full governance process in place in relation to pricing decisions and this would include interest rate changes. All such changes are approved through the Pricing Committee and subsequently by Change Control Committee. In addition, the bank has conducted our own internal audit of our pricing decisions.

      3. If the bank did not commission such an audit please provide a detailed explanation for the reason why the bank did not deem such independent verification necessary.

      A. As outlined in our response to question 2, the bank is not subject to regulated pricing on mortgage interest rates. We are therefore not subject to external independent verification (although as outlined, we internally audit this area to ensure that we act in accordance with standard banking practice). The bank can confirm that all pricing decisions are only taken after robust due diligence has been undertaken and all the risks and benefits have been discussed in detail.

      4. Does the bank accept that in the absence of such independent verification, the increase in the bank’s variable interest cannot be objectively justified? If the bank rejects this assertion, please state the basis on which the bank contends that this assertion is incorrect.

      A. No we do not accept this. As outlined, we operate a robust process whereby the bank’s Pricing Committee carefully consider the commercial justification of any and all price changes. This process is audited by the bank’s internal audit team whose purpose is to ensure that we act in accordance with our own processes, procedures and that we act with probity. We are not required to seek external assessment of commercial decisions relating to increases in our Standard Variable Rate.

      Ultimately, our customers will make their own assessment of our rates and take action if they are dissatisfied by changing provider, which will obviously have clear, measurable consequences for the bank. That is why such decisions are referred to as “commercial decisions” – if our customers do not feel they are justified, they will cease being our customers – the bank therefore considers all factors carefully prior to a price increase.
one can see that this was not a reply to the question posed by the F.S.O. In reality, the Bank cannot objectively justify an increase in variable interest rates without independent verification. How can the F.S.O. ascertain if the increase of mortgage interest rates was valid without:

(i) independent verification that the Bank's cost of funds had increased.

(ii) the bank supplying the F.S.O. with such information.

This is particularly important as it formed part of the Millar's complaint.

Now examining European Communities (Unfair terms in Consumer Contract Regulations) 1995,( SI 27/1995 refer ) in particular Schedule 3 of the Act, terms which have the object or effect of being unfair.

( j ) enabling the seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without a valid reason which is specified in the contract;

( b ) Subparagraph (j) is without hindrance to terms under which a supplier of financial services reserves the right to alter the rate of interest payable by the consumer or due to the latter, or the amount of other charges for financial services without notice where there is a valid reason, provided that the supplier is required to inform the other contracting party or parties thereof at the earliest opportunity and that the latter are free to dissolve the contract immediately.

Therefore the F.S.O. should have sought the necessary documentation from Danske Bank that clearly showed that there was, in fact, an increase in the bank's cost of funds, as asserted by Danske Bank. To do otherwise, would be a dereliction of it's investigative duties. It appears to me that the F.S.O. failed in it's duty to investigate the complaint thoroughly, moreover, the F.S.O. took the Bank at their word, which is wholly unacceptable. It is essentially, within the context of the Millar's complaint, that Danske Bank truthfully answered the question posed by the F.S.O. and that the F.S.O. are in possession of all pertinent material necessary for them to come to a valid determination.
 
I now provide readers with extracts from the Financial Services Ombudsman Office strategic statement 2011 to 2013.


4 Our Values We will: • Be efficient, fair, impartial, transparent and practical in our dealings with complainants and financial service providers; • Deal with admissible complaints fairly and as promptly as possible; • Be proportionate and consistent in our findings and award compensation and direct rectification when necessary; • Engage in dialogue with complainants, financial service providers and stakeholders to try to resolve complaints in an amicable manner; • Publish complaints trends and case studies on a regular basis; • Be open and communicative and place a high emphasis on actively communicating and promoting our role; • Support the work of the Council; • Value and develop our staff. 5

Strategic Goals 1 To operate an efficient, effective and fair dispute resolution process to investigate, mediate and adjudicate on consumer complaints. 2 To raise awareness of our work among the public and stakeholders. 3 To promote compliance by financial service providers with best practice in the provision of products and services. 4 To provide a supportive management and institutional framework in order to develop the skills and competencies of our staff and operate to the highest standards of performance. 5 To support the Council in its work and liaise with Oireachtas Committees, the Department of Finance and other relevant bodies.

Need I say anything more!
 
With regard to Danske Bank's contention in answer to the underlined F.S.O. (question 21(4) refers) that they act with probity

Translation of a statement dated 5 March 2013 from the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finanstilsynet).

In case of discrepancies, the Danish version prevails. Statement on inspection of Danske Bank A/S’s covered bond registers Introduction In December 2012, the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) conducted an inspection (a functional inspection) of Danske Bank A/S. The FSA reviewed the bank’s covered bond registers, from which the bank issues covered bonds. The inspection covered a review of the bank’s ongoing monitoring of pledges in registers, spot checks of whether loans comply with the legal requirements for covered bonds, the bank's compliance with the balance principle and other matters. Summary and risk assessment

The FSA has no comments on the bank's issuance of covered bonds except for a reprimand for erroneous system processing and an incorrect valuation method over several years for certain pledges in the register that contain loans for Irish owner-occupied residences. The total overcollateralisation in the register has been sufficient to ensure, on an ongoing basis, that the total supplementary collateral meets the collateral requirement for covered bonds. The bank subsequently corrected the erroneous system processing and made a revaluation of the properties in question. The Danske Bank Group calculated its solvency need in the third quarter of 2012 at 10.8%. The actual solvency ratio was 19.4%. The inspection did not give rise to any comments from the FSA on the calculation of the solvency need in the areas reviewed.

In other words Danske Bank were caught massaging the Irish Loan values in their cover pool. This is how Danske Bank funds mortgages, ie through covered bonds.
 
Asphyxia,

The internal Audit committee in Danske Bank must have been down the pub when this was also happening, so much for their probity-


The Supreme Court in Latvia has upheld a 2011 decision by the Competition Council to fine 22 Latvian commercial banks for running a cartel, LETA was informed by the Competition Council.

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The decision cannot be appealed.



The banks that initially appealed the CC decision will now have to pay the fine – EUR 7.819 million.



Back in 2011, the Competition Council discovered a cartel among 22 commercial banks regarding commissions on bankcard and ATM services, and decided to fine these banks LVL 5.5 million (EUR 7.81 million) altogether.



Swedbank was imposed a fine of LVL 2.83 million (EUR 4.03 million), Citadele banka – LVL 1.22 million (EUR 1.74 million), SEB banka – LVL 558,744 (EUR 795,021), Latvijas Krajbanka – LVL 259,006 (EUR 368,532), DnB NORD Banka – LVL 167,466 (EUR 238,283), Nordea Bank Finland Plc's branch in Latvia – LVL 158,401 (EUR 225,384), Rietumu Banka – LVL 103,927 (EUR 147,875, GE Money Bank – LVL 79,408 (EUR 112,987), Latvijas Hipoteku un zemes banka (Latvian Mortgage and Land Bank) – LVL 55,594 (EUR 79,103), Norvik banka – LVL 25,227.5 (EUR 35,895), Aizkraukles banka – LVL 15,491 (EUR 22,042),PrivatBank – LVL 5,486 (EUR 7,806), UniCredit Bank – LVL 5,435 (EUR 7,733), Danske Bank's branch in Latvia – LVL 2,688 (EUR 3,825), Baltic International Bank – LVL 2,680 (EUR 3,813), Trasta komercbanka – LVL 2,596 (EUR 3,694), SMP Bank – LVL 2,022 (EUR 2,877), Akciju komercbanka "Baltikums" – LVL 1,364 (EUR 1,941),Regionala investiciju banka – LVL 1,274.5 (EUR 1,813), Latvijas Biznesa banka – LVL 728 (EUR 1,036), LTB Bank – LVL 500 (EUR 711) and VEF banka – LVL 500 (EUR 711).



The illegal agreement was in force from December 1, 2002, until January 7, 2011. Not all banks, however, were parties to the cartel during this entire period.



The Competition Council has determined that the amount of interbank transactions and the commission on bankcard services paid by stores were not economically justified. The commission should have decreased as the amount of bankcard payments and banks' income from these payments increased, but this never happened. Due to the cartel agreement, banks' commission on cash withdrawals or account checks via a different bank's ATMs was also higher than it should have been.
 
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