Brendan Burgess
Founder
- Messages
- 54,803
The proposals by NAMA to provide price guarantees are crazy. They distort the property market to such an extent that it will make the current market value even more difficult to assess. They will create uncertainty which will keep people out of the market. There will be extraordinary legal cases in 5 years over the valuations of property. I support the NAMA project in general, but I have been unable to think of anything positive to say about this. I haven’t seen any other commentator supporting the proposals apart from the Construction Industry Federation.
A better alternative would be for NAMA to lend money on normal market terms to borrowers to buy houses at market prices.
There are people out there with deposits who can’t get loans because of the capital positions of the banks.
NAMA has 40,000(?) homes to sell.
NAMA has €30 billion in loans to property developers
If a NAMA client has 200 unsold homes worth €100k each – NAMA has a non-performing loan of €20m. If NAMA provides 200 mortgages at normal market terms, it will exchange a non-performing loan of €20m for 200 performing loans. If the borrowers provide a 10% deposit, then NAMA’s security has improved also.
Positive impacts on the market
· It makes money available for mortgages which would not have otherwise been available.
· It reduces the oversupply of houses.
Negative impacts on the market
NAMA houses would be more attractive than non-NAMA houses which might lead to a price reduction for the non-NAMA houses. But as it’s bringing fresh money into the market, this negative impact would be limited. And it’s no more negative that NAMA selling off its housing stock at firesale prices.
No-one could object if an overseas mortgage provider entered the market and made mortgages available only to designated properties. In effect, this is what NAMA would be doing.
How would NAMA provide mortgages?
It could set up a subsidiary to do so. As it would not be taking deposits, it would not require a banking license. This would take a lot of time to set up from scratch.
NAMA could, in time, securitise or sell off the mortgage book
At some stage if the securitisation market improves, then NAMA may be able to sell off the mortgage book thus reducing the state’s overall borrowing.
It could subcontract the administration to AIB or some other institution.
But 30 year mortgages exceed NAMA’s lifecycle which is expected to be 10 years
So what if the home loan book of NAMA continues beyond ten years? The ten year time frame is designed to allow the orderly wind down of the bank’s bad loans. If they have been converted into a long-term performing loan book, then that would be ok.
Given that NAMA and AIB are owned by the state, it could be AIB providing the loans directly.
The government gives AIB €1 billion to lend to NAMA properties
AIB customers buy the properties from NAMA
NAMA repays the €1b to the government or repays the loan notes.
In practice this would be the same thing, the government recycling loans from property developers to home owners. But there may be technical problems with this. NAMA bonds are a very cheap form of borrowing. If the loans are on AIB's books, AIB would have to make provisions against them and would need to set capital aside. Could EBS be extracted from AIB to handle these loans?
Presumably NAMA has considered this idea already
Presumably in coming up with price guarantee proposals, they must have looked at lots of other proposals including this one. There might be some disadvantages which I am not thinking of.
A better alternative would be for NAMA to lend money on normal market terms to borrowers to buy houses at market prices.
There are people out there with deposits who can’t get loans because of the capital positions of the banks.
NAMA has 40,000(?) homes to sell.
NAMA has €30 billion in loans to property developers
If a NAMA client has 200 unsold homes worth €100k each – NAMA has a non-performing loan of €20m. If NAMA provides 200 mortgages at normal market terms, it will exchange a non-performing loan of €20m for 200 performing loans. If the borrowers provide a 10% deposit, then NAMA’s security has improved also.
Positive impacts on the market
· It makes money available for mortgages which would not have otherwise been available.
· It reduces the oversupply of houses.
Negative impacts on the market
NAMA houses would be more attractive than non-NAMA houses which might lead to a price reduction for the non-NAMA houses. But as it’s bringing fresh money into the market, this negative impact would be limited. And it’s no more negative that NAMA selling off its housing stock at firesale prices.
No-one could object if an overseas mortgage provider entered the market and made mortgages available only to designated properties. In effect, this is what NAMA would be doing.
How would NAMA provide mortgages?
It could set up a subsidiary to do so. As it would not be taking deposits, it would not require a banking license. This would take a lot of time to set up from scratch.
NAMA could, in time, securitise or sell off the mortgage book
At some stage if the securitisation market improves, then NAMA may be able to sell off the mortgage book thus reducing the state’s overall borrowing.
It could subcontract the administration to AIB or some other institution.
But 30 year mortgages exceed NAMA’s lifecycle which is expected to be 10 years
So what if the home loan book of NAMA continues beyond ten years? The ten year time frame is designed to allow the orderly wind down of the bank’s bad loans. If they have been converted into a long-term performing loan book, then that would be ok.
Given that NAMA and AIB are owned by the state, it could be AIB providing the loans directly.
The government gives AIB €1 billion to lend to NAMA properties
AIB customers buy the properties from NAMA
NAMA repays the €1b to the government or repays the loan notes.
In practice this would be the same thing, the government recycling loans from property developers to home owners. But there may be technical problems with this. NAMA bonds are a very cheap form of borrowing. If the loans are on AIB's books, AIB would have to make provisions against them and would need to set capital aside. Could EBS be extracted from AIB to handle these loans?
Presumably NAMA has considered this idea already
Presumably in coming up with price guarantee proposals, they must have looked at lots of other proposals including this one. There might be some disadvantages which I am not thinking of.