A
In the Republic of Ireland, the smoking of tobacco in all workplaces and public places was banned, and this ban had the support of the majority of the population, including smokers. Also on that day and in the same place, over 5,000 individuals voluntarily declared that they were liable to tax on their offshore bank accounts. This is happening in a country whose popular culture revolves around smoke-filled public houses and where in June 2002 an investigative report running to more than 10,000 pages implicated Charles Haughey, a former prime minister, and many of the political and business elite of large scale and systematic tax evasion running for over 20 years.
The significance of these two acts are as follows. The Republic of Ireland was one of the first to experience an unprecedented economic boom. Now there are signs of stress and of it ending. The subconscious belief of the herd is that the good times will continue only if they can reform and improve human nature and their own cultural predisposition.
The significance of these two acts are as follows. The Republic of Ireland was one of the first to experience an unprecedented economic boom. Now there are signs of stress and of it ending. The subconscious belief of the herd is that the good times will continue only if they can reform and improve human nature and their own cultural predisposition.
Now there are signs of stress and of it ending.
THE FORMER chairman of Ulster Bank, Sir George Quigley, says banks were driven by “herd instinct” into reckless lending due to the highly competitive banking environment in which they operated over recent years.
Speaking ahead of a public lecture yesterday at the Royal Irish Academy (RIA) in Dublin, Sir George said that no financial institution could have “remained a wallflower” watching rival lenders “pirouetting around the dancefloor”.
He said that had banks reined in their lending and been more prudent, shareholders would have demanded higher profits that were being made by rival institutions.
I agree completely.I know its not an argument that will get much sympathy from people but I actually think he has a valid point. Once Anglo Irish Bank began its steller rise offering returns on equity far in excess of what the other Irish banks were producing, the banks had to react. Any bank that did not take part in the property development and speculation market and missed out on returns during the boom years would have been slaughtered by shareholders. They were all chasing the same business and so without a shadow a doubt their lending practices became much more aggressive. I have heard stories about what terms Anglo offered to developers and it was frightening.
Of course the whole point of a regulated market is that this sort of thing should never have been allowed develop. The Central Bank and regulator should have seen this 'herd mentality' and stepped in. Can anyone seriously tell me how Irish Nationwide (a building society) was allowed to build up a balance sheet where the vast majority of assets were loans to developers?
Sounds like a question for the Financial Regulator.Can anyone seriously tell me how Irish Nationwide (a building society) was allowed to build up a balance sheet where the vast majority of assets were loans to developers?
Before embarking on similiar adventures, would it not have been prudent of the other banks to go public with Anglo's ploy. Thereby, either reigning in Fingers' recklessness or at least allowing the public to know what risks their money was open to, once they decided to follow suit. By hiding this info (that most of the produce of the coop was in one extremely dodgy basket) surely the others were equally complicit? A lot of safe investors would not have wanted their money treated like a gambler's last throw of the dice.I know its not an argument that will get much sympathy from people but I actually think he has a valid point. Once Anglo Irish Bank began its steller rise offering returns on equity far in excess of what the other Irish banks were producing, the banks had to react. Any bank that did not take part in the property development and speculation market and missed out on returns during the boom years would have been slaughtered by shareholders. They were all chasing the same business and so without a shadow a doubt their lending practices became much more aggressive. I have heard stories about what terms Anglo offered to developers and it was frightening.
Before embarking on similiar adventures, would it not have been prudent of the other banks to go public with Anglo's ploy. Thereby, either reigning in Fingers' recklessness or at least allowing the public to know what risks their money was open to, once they decided to follow suit. By hiding this info (that most of the produce of the coop was in one extremely dodgy basket) surely the others were equally complicit? A lot of safe investors would not have wanted their money treated like a gambler's last throw of the dice.
The "herd mentality" was mentioned again today.
I heard the AIB internal audit whistleblower say today that bankers will allways tend to herd but that it is the role of the directors/regulators to ensure that this tendency is mitigated/managed.
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