AE does not need any form of smoothing

NoRegretsCoyote

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  • Pension funds should be fully invested in equities during their working life
  • They should stay invested in equities in their retirement
  • Lifestyling is nonsense
I would in general agree with these.

  • Some form of smoothing/risk-sharing is a good idea
Sorry Brendan, butneither are a good idea in the AE context.

Smoothing involves the use of parameters which will be permanently up for debate and will be very hard to explain to a non-expert. Risk-sharing involves current pensioners dipping into funds hypothecated for future pensioners when market values are depressed. There are big implications here. AE really does mean that it is "your money" and not someone else's and as you've said yourself there will be a Joe Duffy moment at some stage.

Anyway if your purpose is (a) to extend pension coverage; (b) no incremental cost to the state; then smoothing and risk-sharing shouldn't feature. The state contributory pension system is already a giant exercise in smoothing and risk-sharing. It doesn't need to be replicated.
 
Hi Coyote

Does this mean that you see no need at all for Colm's proposal?

Everyone should just be 100% invested in equities and they live with the booms and busts?

My long-term savings and pensions are 100% in equities, but most people consider the stock market risky.

So some form of smoothing means that they are much more likely to invest in equities.

I would be prepared to give up some of my gains in exchange for knowing that my fund was not going to fall by 50% all of a sudden.

I don't know the best way to do that.

But credit union savers get a lower rate of interest on their shares and pay a higher rate of interest on their loans to build up a reserve.

If a 25 year old invested in a smoothed fund, they should be prepared to see some of the excess gains in some years go into a reserve to compensate for the losses in other years.

Brendan
 
It would be simpler to allow members to keep their money in the fund on retirement, and draw down as required. This will offer some protection from the boom and bust cycles. It would also reduce costs cost from having to sell units in one fund and buy in another.
 
Everyone should just be 100% invested in equities and they live with the booms and busts?
I think that should be the default during working life, yes.

I think decisions about when to retire and how much to draw down depend a lot on personal circumstances.

I would be prepared to give up some of my gains in exchange for knowing that my fund was not going to fall by 50% all of a sudden.

I don't know the best way to do that.
There is no way to do that! I'm not an efficient markets hypothesis zealot. Some assets like property really are prone to booms and busts. But for equities there really is no better estimate of a portfolio's value than what you could sell it for today.
 
Parking the “smoothing” debate. There is no way AE should be dumping folk on the market at retirement to face costs of 20% or more of their target pension every year.
Most financial advisors are I am sure well meaning but the most they can do is draw pictures of the possible risks various investment strategies would involve. And of course lifestyling is not without its risks - ever heard of inflation?
There is no silver bullet. There should be an officially produced document which sets out the range of risks for different approaches and yes I suppose a range of choices should be made available but no way should folk be defaulted into lifestyling. To paraphrase Einstein this document should be as simple as possible but no more simple than that.
Folk are welcome to seek guidance from an actuarial relative, AAM or indeed a financial advisor. But please, please stop this Pontius Pilate ritual of insisting that they consult a financial advisor and think that washes hands of all responsibility.

Now for one completely out of left field - AE should have been a supplementary State guaranteed DB scheme.
 
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There are so many factors that it is probably hard to come up with a right answer for a group scheme if you go to extremes, 100% in equity would be fairly controversial. Ultimately I think you would want to avoid extremes for a group scheme.

If you are optimistic, have a long life expectancy (most people don't know, but we are moving closer to having Gattaca style data on everyone) and don't mind working longer if needed, 100% equities is less risky for you.

If you hate your job and there is a family history of lower life expectancy, you probably want to avoid crash risk, literally like the plague.
Worst case you have a short underfunded retirement or zero retirement.

Admittedly I'm no expert on AE, I'm in a DB scheme, so apologies in advance if I might be missing a piece of the puzzle in that the risk of delayed retirement is mitigated somehow.

Reducing risk exposure closer to retirement seems to be established practice and academic research seemed to back it up, John Campbell did a lot of relevant work:




Maybe the move away from annuities to ARF's due to low interest rates has changed the picture a bit since then, who knows if that is changing back but there are a lot of arguments for lower interest rates being a systemic change. But even with that maximising your ARF return seems like a very optimistic strategy ignoring mortality.

I think there is something to having some downside insurance for people with a very short investment horizon being funded by giving up some of the upside for people with a much longer investment horizon and Colm's scheme worked a bit like an insurance pool diversified over investment horizon.

Receiving say a 100k boost/insurance into your fund value when the market is down and you are about to retire would be valued a lot more by most people than when your fund is up 100k and you have 20 years to retirement. Some approach that allows the group to exchange the two in a group scheme (granted it might be difficult or impossible to implement) seems interesting.

As Brendan said 'I would be prepared to give up some of my gains in exchange for knowing that my fund was not going to fall by 50% all of a sudden.'

So by taking it off of future investors (who effectively pay it now but it is repaid into their fund when the market is up so really they are using their future '100k when the market is up money'), saves the insurance premium for that guarantee for the whole group. Of course that is all in average and seems to have dependency on the market being cyclical and the periodicity of the crashes and recoverys etc.

Talking about a fund set aside to do the same, there you would lose the equity gains on your reserve fund. But it all would need a lot of analysis on relative utility under various market scenarios and be subject to a large number of assumptions that could turn out to be wrong if there is some big regime shift affecting market behaviour, like the introduction of QE, impact of any UBI on saving and investment etc.

The issue I see with Colm's smoothing approach, apart from possible data mining on the various filter parameters that Coyote points out is that there is no-one profiting from implementing the scheme. Being slightly cynical, people are more likely to get on board with things when they see future fees coming their way, this is a move in the opposite direction.

Based on Coyote's observations, looking at the smoothed index for the UK in Figure 2 in Colm's paper and evaluating the amount of time that the market is above it, that seems most of the time in Figure 2 except for the two main crashes and the amount of the drop insured seems very sensitive to the ERP parameter in Figure 7 and less so to the p parameter in Figure 8.

The question then is it worth it overall depends on the value of insuring the drops versus the net lost utility when the market is above the smoothed index evaluated for the whole group and the drop mitigation and the forfeited returns look to be very sensitive to the ERP.

Aswath Damadoran publishes historical ERP figures for the US and they vary quite a bit (file attached, but again that would depend on the method used to estimate ERP, he is one of the leading researchers in that area in academia but maybe an average of a bunch of estimators would be better practice to use). Using the previous year one for the following year and updating yearly and re-running the evaluations in the paper would be a good start to shed more light on the data fitting concern. It seems less sensitive to p but again you'd need to show that for more than just 2 values, in particular show the optimal p over a bunch of markets and periods to show the variation and to get the optimal one you need some scheme utility score that you are optimising. I think it needs to address group utility and show that for a representative investor it results in overall utility gains most of the time.

I think the conclusion of the paper should be clearer and succinct if the message is to be brought across, e.g targeting something like the below:

I show that using a smoothed index target for an AE scheme, the average utility gain to a representative investor over investment in the raw index is x% , and show this gain to be statistically significant. Investors (across a range of commonly used investor utility functions and risk aversion parameters) benefit from the scheme in (90%, 95%, 100%?) of the rolling 30 year time frames examined in our study across 3 countries (use 20 countries?). This is robust to the selected 30 year investment period, using over 150 years of data. All evaluation is completely out of sample with all model parameters estimated using prior historical data point in time in a rolling window.

On the general cost question, surely some simple, infrequently rebalanced SAA approach using index ETF's would be very low cost.
I get that 100% equities is simpler but there is so much money involved in this the economy of scale on implementing that must be huge.

In terms of the fund composition maybe there needs to be some process on that such as a risk questionnaire sent out and a democratic average setting used, people tend to be more risk averse than is good for them so the framing of the questions would be important.

A range of options: you are willing to lose x amount of the fund on retirement for a y% return overall.

Then you have some constraints for the SAA , you have to chose the assets allowed and the optimiser and the rebalancing frequency, it could all be mostly automated without any committee decisions.
 

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I think in any Figures showing Market vs Smooth, it should also be shown for reference purposes the lifestyling default approach, making it clear that this latter is simply not at the races.
 
I think the issue is that this is a holistic approach the downside mitigation enables full investment in the index.
But it results in people overpaying at certain times and the balanced fund doesn't.

So you are not comparing like with like.

This fund is a derivative of the market index with a payoff that is determined by a function of the historical index (smoothing function).

It's a new type of derivative, that's going to explain a big part of the issue in selling the idea, a derivative that's never been used before for a state run pension scheme is going to be an uphill battle.
 
This fund is a derivative of the market index with a payoff that is determined by a function of the historical index (smoothing function).
Cash Flow is also a major input to the derivative so no hope of any analytical evaluation of its payout at some future point in time. However Colm argues that the open ended value of the members' accounts is their market value, as smooth value is only a device for determining its allocation and distribution.
 
Another risk is what if investors stop joining, e.g. another option/fund is introduced, like the differences pre/post 2013 for public sector pensions (maybe due to pressure after underperforming the market for a while, the now accepted terminology for which is 'Joe Duffy risk' :D ).

The people in the old scheme may have overpaid for the previous generation retiring but don't have anyone left to overpay in a market drop when they retire. I think this may have been mentioned already, though I think it was government risk that was discussed.
 
Another risk is what if investors stop joining, e.g. another option/fund is introduced, like the differences pre/post 2013 for public sector pensions (maybe due to pressure after underperforming the market for a while, the now accepted terminology for which is 'Joe Duffy risk' :D ).

The people in the old scheme may have overpaid for the previous generation retiring but don't have anyone left to overpay in a market drop when they retire. I think this may have been mentioned already, though I think it was government risk that was discussed.
There is no doubt that the issues involved when market values are significantly and for a long time below smooth values need to be addressed. The opposite scenario where market values exceed smoothed values and the government does a smash and grab or Joe Duffy whips up the mob to storm CPA House are just silly IMHO.
Now in the depressed scenario you have really identified two risks. The first risk is that people stop joining or contributing and switch to a conventional arrangement. Colm demonstrates that there is a very significant headroom before this is rational, so powerful are the cost and ERP benefits of his proposal.
The second risk is that Joe Duffy (now in retirement) launches the Smooth with Joe AE alternative. It is a valid challenge. There would of course be significant barriers to Joe launching his new vehicle by which time AE Tried and Trusted might have recovered full health. It is for sure the sort of issue that an independent review would want to explore.
 
There is no doubt that the issues involved when market values are significantly and for a long time below smooth values need to be addressed. The opposite scenario where market values exceed smoothed values and the government does a smash and grab or Joe Duffy whips up the mob to storm CPA House are just silly IMHO.
Now in the depressed scenario you have really identified two risks. The first risk is that people stop joining or contributing and switch to a conventional arrangement. Colm demonstrates that there is a very significant headroom before this is rational, so powerful are the cost and ERP benefits of his proposal.
The second risk is that Joe Duffy (now in retirement) launches the Smooth with Joe AE alternative. It is a valid challenge. There would of course be significant barriers to Joe launching his new vehicle by which time AE Tried and Trusted might have recovered full health. It is for sure the sort of issue that an independent review would want to explore.
Hopefully Joe won't use Gay Byrne's old accountant :D
 
I attach my submission on the Strawman in 2018 which is not a million miles away from what we are discussing here.
 

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Smoothing involves the use of parameters which will be permanently up for debate and will be very hard to explain to a non-expert. Risk-sharing involves current pensioners dipping into funds hypothecated for future pensioners when market values are depressed. There are big implications here. AE really does mean that it is "your money" and not someone else's and as you've said yourself there will be a Joe Duffy moment at some stage.

Anyway if your purpose is (a) to extend pension coverage; (b) no incremental cost to the state; then smoothing and risk-sharing shouldn't feature.
I would like to put flesh on my responses by referring to Table 1 on page 9 of my paper to the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries. Here it is for ease of reference:
1673611047679.png

This shows what smoothed returns would have looked like if the AE scheme had started on 1 January 2020, with cash flows as shown above for the first 6 months, i.e. 10 in Jan, 20 in Feb, 30 in March, etc. Those cash flows are not unreasonable estimates of what cash flows would look like as the scheme was gradually rolled out.
The unsmoothed monthly returns are -3.3%, -8.9%, -15.1%, +4.9%, +3.4% and +1.5%. Pretty scary. A 20% range from low (-15.1%) to high (+4.9%).
Smoothed returns by contrast wouldn't worry your granny: +0.29%, +0.23%, +0.13%, +0.25%, +0.31%, +0.33%. She would probably ask OK why the smoothed return fell in March to "just" 0.13%, to be told that the fall was due to the market dropping by 15% in the month (it dropped by 20% part-way through March 2020).

Now lets' deal with the questions one by one:
Smoothing involves the use of parameters which will be permanently up for debate and will be very hard to explain to a non-expert.
The first parameter "up for debate" is "p", the weighting to give to each month's market value. I state on page 8 of the paper that
"the smoothed fund valuation assigns a weighting (p) to that month's market value and a weighting (1-p) to the previous month's smoothed value increased by the expected long-term return, and adding cashflows in the month. The ratio p is fixed from the outset and cannot be varied subsequently."
I underlined the final sentence to answer @NoRegretsCoyote 's question about the parameter being "constantly up for debate". Once "p" is set at the outset, that's it. It can never be revisited (I discuss the "never revisited" statement in Section 6 of the paper. It may be worth reading that section of the paper before coming back to me on it).
A value for "p" of 1% was used for example 1, i.e. 1% weighting for current market value, 99% weighting to last month's smoothed value increased by the expected long-term return. Obviously, there would be a lot of discussion among experts, before the scheme is launched, over whether 1% or something higher or lower should be used. In the paper, I conclude that experts would most likely fix on a figure somewhere between 1% and 1.5%. The most important point for the purposes of this discussion, however, is that once it's fixed, that's it. No further debate or disagreement, ever.
The other parameter in the table is the assumed long-term return on the fund. I chose 4% for the table. I also looked at how different the graph would look if a 5% long-term return were assumed.



1673612250019.png

The "4%" and "5%" graphs look very different, but as I wrote to you on a separate thread in this discussion:
As you know, what's important to the investor is not the absolute value of an index but the change in its value over time. The "5%" index in figure 8 (you wrote figure 6 but I think you meant figure 8) grows by 72.8% between years 15 and 20 - month 180 to month 240. That's an average growth rate of 11.56% a year. The "4%" index grows by 71.9% over the same period, an average of 11.44% a year. As you can see, the two growth rates are very close, implying that the choice of 4% or 5% assumed growth rate in the smoothing formula isn't important in the long run.
What you can't have, of course, is moving from the 4% index to the 5% index, i.e., moving from the blue line to the orange line in figure 8. That's what I meant by the statement that "careful governance will be required." The important point, as demonstrated by the graphs and my sample figures above, is consistency over time. This is an area where the economists in the ESRI will add value.
That point still stands.
I hope that I have dealt adequately with your concern that "it involves the use of parameters that will be permanently up for debate." The two parameters are the weighting to give to the current month's market value and the assumed long-term return. As I said, the first is decided on at the outset (likely to be somewhere between 1% and 1.5% and is left unaltered from there on, so is never up for debate subsequently). The second is of less importance (e.g. above example showing difference between 11.44% over 5 years and 11.56% average over 5 years, depending on whether a long-term return assumption of 4% or 5% is used). Nevertheless, I do say (bottom of page 21 of the paper):
"in theory, the chosen value of “it” should be the trustees’ best estimate of the expected long-term return at time t, composed of the expected risk-free return plus the expected Equity Risk Premium (ERP). Whilst the risk-free component is readily observable in the market, the same is not true for the ERP. Even among experts, opinions vary widely[1]. Therefore, careful governance will be required around its periodic assessment. The likelihood is that the trustees will reassess the expected long-term return only once a year, possibly less frequently. Also, to ensure continuity, constraints may be placed on the extent to which expected return will be allowed to vary from one year to the next."

Your next sentence is:
Risk-sharing involves current pensioners dipping into funds hypothecated for future pensioners when market values are depressed. There are big implications here. AE really does mean that it is "your money" and not someone else's and as you've said yourself there will be a Joe Duffy moment at some stage.

I think we've discussed this already and that I've answered it in another thread. I can't find it to hand, but if you refer again to Table 1 above, let's say that the net cash flow of +30 in March 2020 is made up of +50 for new and existing contributors and -20 for a new retiree on that date. They're all getting the same price. I don't understand how the comment about current pensioners dipping into funds hypothecated for future pensioners when markets are depressed relates to what's happening here. Could you explain please, ideally by reference to the example of Table 1 above or, say table 2 on the same page of the paper.
I'll try to come back to other comments/queries in your post later.



[1] See for example https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3861152 The survey shows an average market risk premium for the US (1,756 respondents) of 5.5%, with a range from 3.1% to 8%.
 

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